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THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION AND THE SACRALIZED
BALKAN NATIONS REGARDING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
By Faruk Hadžić
Faruk Hadžić is an independent researcher from Zenica, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. He is
currently working as a project volunteer in NGO, Lotos - Protection de Sante Mental. He
received a BSc in Psychology and Economics, Diploma (MBTA) in Mindfulness-Based
Transactional Analysis and MSc in Security Studies, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement
from the University of Modern Sciences, B&H. His research is multidisciplinary in social and
political psychology, economics, critical security studies, criminal justice, and political
science.
Abstract
Ethnic, national, and confessional affiliation in ex-Yugoslavia add to political radicalization.
As a form of political power, politicized religions are, psychologically speaking, unconscious
non-faith. Due to new national-state theoretical inadequacy, (i.e., nationalism as an ideology),
religion is used as an instrument of socialization and legitimization of new national-political
state subjects. When nation and religion become “controversial” identification and mark
others as potentially dangerous, through a policy that allegedly aims to "affirm" and "protect"
its people and their faith, then in local historical and current circumstances, it essentially
implies antagonism in the most dramatic conflicts. The historical revisionism and the
memory of the "evil" developed into a behavioral practice.
Keywords: politicized religions, sacralized nations, ethnopolitics, ex-Yugoslavia,
ethnonational identity, religious identity, "evil" memory

Introduction
In the former Yugoslavia, or to use a more neutral name, the Balkans, the ambitions
of some, especially under the influence of overemphasized ethnic nationalisms, the aspiration
of many was to unite the whole area under a single nation and denomination. This would then
lead to war, ethnic cleansing, and destruction. We can say that nationalists in the former
Yugoslavia were prone to claim the historical soil of their ancestors, who long ago
established a flourishing state 1 —a defined area to which members could identify and to
whom they felt they belong. Ideologies of internal discord and destruction would be given a
chance in extreme historical turbulence when there was not much time for discussion and

1

Emile Durkheim, Durkheim on Politics and the State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 81.
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search for reasonable solutions. These became natural allies of imperialism which was
imposed by force from outside. The Second World War and the Nazi-Fascist occupation
were such, in which domestic forces were also engaged in a fratricidal war, aided by
theological rhetoric and traditional mythologies.2 This is not the subject of this study but

there is a vital link of the observed phenomena, 3 such as the insistence that Serbian
Orthodoxy is the core of Serbian national identity and pride. Religious officials blessed
weapons in the First and Second World Wars, in the post-Yugoslav wars, "consolidating the
position on the justification of killing in the name of God."4 Let us recall that none of the
religious communities in Yugoslavia protested (except the Jewish one) for wearing religious
symbols on military uniforms, and vehicles during the Second World War.
Samuel P. Huntington proposed the thesis that religion "gained in importance and
political influence," including in the essay, "God is here again." Considering the relationship
between religion (church and mosque) and politics in the former Yugoslavia, it is impossible
to bypass the relationship between the religious (church and mosque) political parties. It is
not easy to say when a religion/religious community uses politics, and when a political party
uses religion/religious community. Most likely it is a reciprocal process.
The historical moment of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism
opened a path for the renewal of the ideologies of internal discord and destruction in the
former Yugoslavia. Externally imposed ethnonational elements were present during the
communist era; however, religious identities were not expressed in public and political life.
The religiously conditioned constructs of "Croats-Serbs-Bosniaks" became political programs

The battle of Kosovo field took place in 1389 between an army led by the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović
and an invading army of the Ottoman Empire under the command of Sultan Murad Hüdavendigâr in today
Kosovo. Reliable historical accounts of the battle are scarce. The myth about Kosovo was created for the
stimulation of the First Serbian uprising in 1804 made by the Habsburg intelligence service. Later legends about
the continuity of Serbian and Montenegrin heroism against "Turkish oppression," were fabricated by folk
singers about Serbian heroes who were, in my opinion, mostly common robbers, a glorification of banditry and
robbery. This continued in the literary works of Ivo Andrić and Miloš Crnjanski in which ancient “Turkish”
crimes against Serbs were invented and Serbs portrayed in national “romantic narratives, to the point of kitsch,
all amid terrible Chetnik crimes against Bosniaks during the Second World War. https://stav.ba/junastvo-ubicai-razbojnika-standardni-obrazac-srpske-mitologije/, (2019), The Kosovo myth or Kosovo cult is one of the
critical Serbian political myths, which forms the basis of Serbian national identity and the "atomic core” of
Serbian nationalism. http://www.nspm.rs/kulturna-politika/kosovski-mit-i-srpski-nacionalni-identitet.html,
(2009)
3
A former commander of the Army of the Republic of Srpska, Ratko Mladić (ICTY convict), on July 11, 1995,
in Srebrenica, literally announced genocide against civilians in front of the cameras in Srebrenica’s "Safe zone"
of the United Nations. "Here we are in Serbian Srebrenica. On the eve of another great Serbian holiday, we are
giving this city to the Serbian people.” "Finally, the moment has come for us to take revenge on the Turks in this
area." said Mladić. https://www.dw.com/sr/dugo-očekivana-presuda/a-41448520.
4
Iztok Simonitit, Tri boga, dvije kulture, jedna civilizacija, [Three gods, two cultures, one civilization].(Zagreb:
“Naklada Pavičić,“ 2014), 92.
2
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in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo (capitals of Serbia, Croatia and BiH 5 ), and religious
hierarchies became again the most faithful allies of ethnopolitics. Thus, political unrest and
struggles for ethnically pure Balkan communities sparked the above mentioned reactionary
ideological rhetoric in the 1990s. All Croats became "Ustašas,”6 all Serbs "Četniks,”7 and all
Muslims "Turks"8 or "Balije.”9 The cult of the "sacred" past10 is a compelling destructive
paradigm of the Balkans. It has the function of preserving the exclusivity and purity of ethnic
identity and "returning to the roots," to which normative significance has been assigned, to
emphasize the primacy of collectivism over individualism and pluralism. The basis of such a
collectivist pattern is the identification of cultural-ethnic and institutional-political identity, in
which the political community fully identifies with the national or ethnic community.
In the South Slavic area (with special reference to the former Yugoslavia), religions
have always played an important role in the ethnonational formation. However, this does not
mean that nationalists have an affinity for religion, nor that they are true believers, as was
clearly shown in Eastern and Southeastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall when
national leaders very quickly "crossed the path" from Communist Party membership to
religion. Simultaneously, the increase in religiosity mostly coincided with the transition from
one quasi-religious (communist) ideology to another system (nationalist ideologies). The
worst phase in Sarajevo began immediately after the recognition of B&H's independence in
1992, which was the most critical area of ex-Yugoslavia multiethnic discourse.11 The fact is
5

BiH and B&H are the usual abbreviations for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ustaša is a term colloquially used to describe members of the Croatian fascist movement founded in 1929 by
Ante Pavelić under the name Ustaša-Croatian Revolutionary Organization (UHRO), which Nazi Germany
appointed the ruling party in 1941 after the founding of the Independent State of Croatia. Another name of the
Ustaša organization is Croatian Liberation Movement (UHOP)
7
Četniks are members of a Serbian military organization with a distinctly nationalist chauvinistic Greater Serbia
goal. (Croatian Encyclopedia, 2000).
8
The vow of revenge for enslavement under the Turks was passed down through the mother's milk from
generation to generation. That is why we heard about Turks during the entire war of the 1990s, and rarely about
Bosniaks.
9
Balija is a term used today in the Balkans as a derogatory term for Muslims. The etymology of the term Balija
came to the Balkans from the Turkish language, although the word originally comes from the Greek language,
more precisely from the word (Βάλιος), which meant the immortal horse of Achilles. The Turkish dictionary
states that this term is used positively, i.e., that it means older adults, worthy of respect and brave.
10
In this sense, there is probably a no better example than Kosovo, which is considered the holy land of Serbian
Orthodoxy, an actual museum of symbols and a living past of centuries of conflict between Christians and
Muslims. It is not surprising, then, that the first spark of unrest in the former Yugoslavia ignited precisely where
the past was most accessible: the memory of betrayal, holy wars, mythical heroism, and unrequited defeats. And
then at one point that memory suddenly burst into the present, brutal and unstoppable. Then the bigger war
could begin. See Jakov Jukić, “Političke religije i memorija zla”[Political Religions and the Memory of Evil],
UDC 316: 2,(1996): 1.
11
The most common comparison and description of B&H, i.e., Sarajevo, is to see it like a European Jerusalem,
with a mosque, a cathedral, a church, and a synagogue in one block. However, in essence, B&H's
multiculturalism is a very controversial and complex concept, both in discussions within B&H and in the
representation of B&H in the world. For centuries, the multiculturalism and multiethnicity of B&H have been
6
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that the 1990s witnessed a systematic political mobilization of a significant portion of
existing religious traditions and available significant religious resources and political
mobilization of the religious symbolism of all three major religions present in the area. Also,
on a symbolic level, this was evident in the early stages of political conflicts and some of
their critical moments, but, of course, with very significant differences between particular
religions. Another critical fact is that in the dramatic events of the early 1990s, all three
religious communities, which treated religion as an essential source of political legitimacy
and acting as national, politically legitimizing instances of the first order, provided and
supplied appropriate nationalist political strategies with additional legitimacy. In this way, all
dominant nationalist strategies practically operated under a special "sacred canopy."12
The term "political religion" appeared in 1938 in Erich Voegelin’s text. Political
religions are nothing but a response to the crisis of modernity,13 and religious institutions are
most often the form through which political religion develops. In the former Yugoslavia,
followers of three monotheistic religions, Orthodoxy, Islam, and Catholicism, often live
intermingled.
One should also make a distinction between the concepts of religion and faith. It
suffices to say that the term "faith" is considerably broader.14 Hence the necessity of the
following question: what is religion? Logically, religion would be just a specific external
expression of faith. As an outward expression of faith, religion is viewed as a path to God. It
can be said that "only the faith that is unequivocally apolitical is original." 15 The
politicization of these two mutual concepts creates numerous troubles and religiously colored
conflicts that further complicate the already complex and nationalist-burdened social and
public scene.

affirmed and challenged both externally and internally. It is argued and challenged ideologically, historically,
politically, by coexistence, wars, conflicts, and urbanism. At the same time, with its thousand-year coexistence,
tolerance, and multiethnicity, B&H is a model for survival in Europe. It confirms this with its survival centuries
before
the
declarations
of
human
rights
by
both
the
EU
and
its
institutions.
A.Hasanović,,http://avdijahasanovic.blogger.ba/arhiva/2018/12/07/4124757,2018.
12
Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, (Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1990).
13
Žarko Paić, “The triumph of political religions identity policy and the twilight of culture“ Europske studije –
European Studies,(2015): 218.
14
Faith is expressed in various forms, such as faith in oneself, faith in a leader, faith in a nation, faith in a class,
faith in science, faith in progress, faith in chance. None of these forms of faith have anything to do with
religious faith which is the belief in something mystical and absolute. Hence, the notions of faith and religion
cannot be equated in scope or content, because faith, as we know, is a broader notion than religious faith. See
Đuro Šušnjić, “Special Editions of ANUBiH CLXXXVI”, ODN 13, (2009): 18.
15
Vjekoslav Perica, Balkanski idoli. Religija i nacionalizam u jugoslovenskim državama, [Balkan Idols:
Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States], (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 204.
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Thus, in the late 1980s and 1990s (still relevant today), there was a significant
activation of some contents of religious tradition, religious culture, and religious symbolism
for political purposes. Special conditions enabled religious communities to occupy an
important position in society and gain influence. At the same time, the fear of losing identity
within multinational communities, such as Yugoslavia, after its disintegration led to the
sudden "emergence" of antagonistic individual national identities, has led to claims of being
indivisible, belligerent, and exclusive. In this regard, the connection between ethnonational
policies, violence, and religion is visible in the wars of the 1990s, where the war in all
national religions (Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam) found proponents of personal
sacrifice for the good of nations. Belonging to a certain army and wearing religious symbols
(rosary and cross), giving certain signs (raising two or three fingers in the air), or shouting
messages of religious content (Allahu Akbar) did not presuppose that soldiers and their
commanders should know religious truths and dogmas. However, that made belonging to a
certain denomination a pure-blooded national affiliation. In this sense, the responsibility of
religious communities in the Yugoslav disintegration is unquestionable, because no less
beloved, they have contributed to the development of trivial ideologies that have outgrown
mere respect for the material and spiritual goods of their people. The ideologies of the
complete removal of others and the careful labeling of members of one's ethnic group, the
"tribes," returned to the stage in the 1990s. Thus, in the political circumstances and troubles
of the former Yugoslavia, religion became an ethnically instrumentalized expression of
religion more important than itself. Although for some analysts, it was a religious conflict in
which all religious communities played an active role, it is more likely in this case that the
religious and political dimensions of the conflict could not be separated.
I suggest that religion is the foundation of society and the source of every good, even
politics. I also suggest that religion belongs to the universal and eternal realm, the sublime; it
"deals" with the highest and most stable values. Politics deals—no matter how pretentious—
with the definite and the temporary, the almost instantaneous. It is unreliable, because
usually, most occupations are pragmatic and profitable, for the realization of which
necessarily positions, orientations, and inclinations change. At the same time, politics is a
skill of maneuvering while faith is an attachment to enduringly stable values and principles.
In today's modern Europe, religious identity has become a matter of personal choice, best
illustrated by the phrase "belief without belonging.” The "happy paradox" of secularism,
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according to Mardešić, 16 lies in the fact that it weakens the political nature of religion,
opening the space for strengthening the religiosity of religion in or outside religious
institutions themselves. However, the emergence of religion in public space is also defined as
deprivation, and this process is considered crucial from the 1980s to the present day.
According to J. Casanova,17 this deprivation means above all the fact that religious traditions
around the world refuse to accept the marginal and private role reserved for them by theories
of secularism. All states of the former Yugoslavia are constitutionally and legally defined as
secular states. It implies separating political issues from those concerning religion, but at the
same time it does not mean—as modern proponents of negative secularization want—to
ignore, degrade or expel religion, religious institutions, and theologians from society.
However, the objections coming from these circles are justified, given the constant
inclinations by religious communities and their leaders toward theocratic society, to gain for
their religious-dogmatic beliefs social and political (and even legal, constitutional)
confirmation. This is the label of all newly formed states in the former Yugoslavia in which
public life is increasingly "clericalized."
It is a fact that religion and religious community's social positions are stronger if they
help to establish identity. This is the case in the post-Yugoslav space. The stronger their
influence on identity creation, the greater their influence on political life. In the former
Yugoslavia, political polarization is carried out on a confessional/nationalist basis. Muslims
support Bosniak candidates, Catholics support Croats, and Orthodox candidates support
Serbs. In contrast, when they are in the other two areas, they have found themselves in a
"minority" position, with the majority of the population making no critical distinction (even
today) between ethnic/confessional/national identities. Religions are thus reduced first to the
nation, and then to power.
Thus, a specific (extremely negative) characteristic of the post-Yugoslav space is that
religions are identified with nations (majority). In this way, the confession is accepted as a
political doctrine, so that the national interest of ex-Yugoslav ethnopolitics can be
subordinated to the confessional one. We had situations during the dramatic disintegration of
the former Yugoslavia where some religious communities/clergy encouraged the sacralnational government to devastate, kill, and rape by sending hordes to criminal exploitation
with their religious blessings; the ideology of the complete removal of others, by supreme
16

Željko Mardešić, “Religija u postmodernitetu: nestanak ili povrat svetoga?”[Religion in postmodernity: the
disappearance or return of the sacred], Zbornik. Muke sa svetim, (Niš: “Niški kulturni centar,” 2007).
17
Jose Casanova,”Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,” The Hedgehog Review 8,
(2006): 7-22.
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authorities. The main role of the ruling elites, and the acquisition and consolidation of power,
was the construction of national identity that was accompanied by great violence based on the
most terrible, aggressive expression of the rebirth of nationality. Finally, such elitist and
politics further encouraged religions to become nationally ideologized religions, i.e.,
intolerant religious ideologies. 18 The result is the undisguised exclusivity of such selfselected religious ideologies, precluding the dialogue between them. It is up to rational
thinking to prevent or reduce, together with "Faith," the ideological-pragmatic manipulation
by which nationalized religion asserts its position in the service of daily political goals.
The tragic circumstance for all Balkan nations and states is that peace, more precisely
non-warfare between them, now as in the past, is guaranteed only by the great powers. There
are a few places in the world where a "culture of hope" is so difficult and slow to be created
as in the Balkans, especially in B&H, where the winds of historical humiliation, fear, and
hatred among nations still flow. The "culture of fear" grows into a powerful inspiration into
the "culture of hatred," which always quickly and effectively grows into a "culture of
violence." The existence of a "minority and majority" or "friend and enemy" relationship (the
enemy is always that of another religion or the atheist) is the foundation of the symbiosis of
the political, religious, and ethnonational factors in the ex-Yugoslav communities. This
symbiosis fills part of the personal space of human intimacy and becomes the dominant form
of behavior for the new generations. Most religious leaders in the former Yugoslavia again
failed to publicly acknowledge their actual cooperation in the bloody nationalist wars of the
1990s. Sensitivity to the suffering of others as the basis of the monotheistic ethos, but also a
condition of the truthfulness of memory, has long since been expelled from the pulpits of
religious communities (if it existed at all).19 With religious myths of their own innocence,
which are tirelessly disseminated, believers are socio-politically prepared to adopt the
nationalist-archaic constructions by leaders whose “amnesia” is the result of their nationalreligious narcissism.

1. The Broader Discourse of Phenomena within the Former Yugoslavia
When it comes to studying and determining the origins, causes, and mechanisms of
the mobilization of ethnic-religious groups, using ethnic-religious identity as a resource for

18

Esad Bajtal, “Religion, fascism and anti-fascism in BiH: Contribution to the phenomenology of religious
cynicism of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” Zbornik Orbus, Zagreb (2005): 1.
19
B. O'Connor, ed., The Adorno Reader) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 36.
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political mobilization, we find a significant starting point in classical elite theorists,20 but
later also in the views of modern elite theorists. Both classical and modern theorists share the
view that ethnicity is primarily a political phenomenon. The basis of a collectivist pattern in
post-Yugoslav countries is the identification of cultural-ethnic and institutional-political
factors by which the political community fully identifies with the national or ethnic
community. Ethnicism in the former Yugoslavia, as an ideology of a pure kind, is a
speculative skill of "counting blood cells" and a controversial rule "in the name of the
people." Such undisguised exclusivity of self-selected nominations prevents any possible
communion and dialogue between them. It enabled political decision-makers, within the
pernicious ideological-pragmatic manipulation of nationalized religion to serve daily political
goals, to act according to the matrix of the old feudal-imperialist conception that each
community and each territory has its religion and each individual belongs first to his/her
community, and only then to the political space. Thus, for obvious reasons, the former
Yugoslavia requires a unique approach: religious references were reactivated in a war frame
to the most destructive genocidal apocalypse in the heart of Europe. In a study on the
involvement of religions in the war, the sociologist, Srdjan Vrcan, concluded that it is about
strengthening the link between Orthodoxy and nationalism in Serbia, the affirmation of an
ecclesiae militants in a climate that is very conducive to Catholic integration in Croatia, and
the strengthening of pan-Islamism in B&H. He argues that "religions have shown, in the
Yugoslav crisis, that (...) they are more capable of distancing than of uniting, of separating
than of gathering, of opposing than of bringing together, of igniting rather than calming."21
In the early 1990s, the multiethnic tradition could not resist the nationalism that had
penetrated through all the pores of disintegrating communism. Consequently, various anticommunist and nationalist elements began to gain increasing influence. Therefore, it should
be no surprise that all institutionalized religions (Serbian Orthodoxy, Croatian Catholicism,
and Bosnian Islam) have taken on the roles as leaders of ethnonationalism. Part of the high
clergy became distinctly nationalistic and patriotic, treating the concepts of democracy,
liberalism, freedom of conscience, and Western culture as distinctly negative (usually the
Serbian example). Nationalist sentiments were systematically created, committed to creating
conditions in which the manifestation of nationalism was the only desirable public pattern of
20

V. Pareto, G. Mosca, and R. Michels were cofounders of the Italian school of elitism, which influenced
subsequent elite theory in the Western tradition. It is important to note that they do not analyze ethnicity
directly.
21
Srdjan Vrcan, The War in ex-Yugoslavia: The Involvement of Religions: Sea of War, a Sea of Religions,
(Florence: Cultura della Pace Editions, 1994).
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behavior. During this period, there was a desecularization of public life which was seen in an
increasing number of participants in religious ceremonies, an increasing emphasis on
religious symbols, and demonstrations of personal and collective religious affiliation.
Paradoxically, during communism, there was a certain contempt for people who went to a
church or mosque and who honored or celebrated religious holy days. The collapse of the
communist system introduced the sanctity of faith and nation, especially in these three
nations, where one’s ethnicity also means their religion. Being Serbian is at the same time
being an Orthodox; Croatian and Catholic are synonym, just as Bosniaks are Muslims. The
sacralization of nation implies the transfer of the functions and expressive forms of religion
to the nation by creating a structural analogy between the modern nation and religion.
However, this does not mean that nationalists of former Yugoslavia have an affinity for
religion, nor are they true believers, as was clearly shown in Eastern and Southeastern Europe
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when many national communist leaders very quickly
"crossed paths" into church membership. Both then and today the question arises: did they go
to church or mosques to reconsider their "dark communist" past, or because they were aware
that they would find religious officials in those areas "who would receive them and give them
the necessary religious legitimacy so that the believers who were the basis for gaining
political power would not reject them, but accepted their new political parties as to the only
possible and lasting solution.”22 We must not forget the difficult budget items associated with
the establishment of new national ideologies, for example, religious indoctrination in public
schools, financing of state television stations as the propaganda machine, payment from the
budget for revisionist historic research, and an invention of new "linguistics" (especially in
Croatia),

23

construction of colossal religious worship places and religious symbols,

monuments to new politicians, construction of pilgrimage centers, plush residences of
religious authorities, and similar economically unprofitable projects. Religious programs
dominated state television, and atheism was no longer the worldview option for new
generations but an obstacle to public action and career. Representatives of national parties in
the region did their best to make religious communities faithful servants in obtaining the

Ivan Markešić, Od religijskog do nacionalnog identiteta i natrag (na primjeru Bosne i Hercegovine), [From
religious to national identity and back,(case of Bosnia and Herzegovina)], (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti
Ivo Pilar, 2008), 15.
23
The majority of Croatian linguists of Tudjman's time believed that the suppression (and sometimes clear
prohibition) of lexical and other Croatian linguistic features and the imposition of the Serbian language should
be resisted. Moreover, finally, today, they believe that the flood of English should be opposed. Dejan Brozović,
“O jeziku dr. Franje Tuđmana”, [“On the language of dr. Franjo Tudjman”],Journal of the Culture of the
Croatian Literary Language, Hrvatsko filološko društvo, Vol 47, Issue 2. (1999):41-80.
22
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required number of Islamic-Bosniak, Catholic-Croat, and Orthodox-Serb votes, which they
(religious communities) gladly accepted, considering their service to the Goddess of the
Nation as a fulfillment of God’s plan here on earth.
The connection between ethnonational policies, violence, and religion is visible in
recent wars, where war has found proponents of personal sacrifice for the good of the nation
in all national religions. Croatian defenders with a rosary around their necks laid their lives
on the "Altar of the Homeland." Serbian fighters died "for the honorable cross and the
Orthodox faith. Bosnian Muslims fought with shouts of "Allahu Akbar." The very
politicization of religion has always been associated with biological needs, a genetic survival
strategy, empowering group survival, and the memory of "evil,"24 which is the foundation of
post-Yugoslav antagonism.
Serbian cases of religiously motivated nationalism were much more open than
Croatian ones. The Orthodox Church openly supported aggressive actions against others, and
soldiers were even blessed before and after the crime with a reference to the Martyr Serbian
Prince Lazar, of the 14th -century, although the Serbian Orthodox Church simultaneously
denied carrying out large outbreaks of violence and organized rapes. They claimed these
were occasional excesses even when genocidal public and private expulsion of Bosniaks and
Albanians from their homes was evident. 25 Shrines, mosques and Muslim buildings,
including limitless number of gems of Balkan Islamic architecture, were destroyed during the
war in B&H. It should be borne in mind that there is, above all, a destructive symbolic act at
work. Churches and mosques were not destroyed so much as religious buildings, but as
national, ethnic symbols of a particular community's presence in a territory. The systematic
destruction of cultural monuments (culturocide) has been proposed as indirect evidence of the
Serbs' desire to destroy Bosniaks as an ethnic group (referring to the genocidal intentions
defined in Marusen and Mennecke).26 Soldiers and criminalized hordes, within ideologies of
the complete removal of others, as supreme authorities, were sent with religious blessings.
Many records from the wars tell us about the presence of religious officials on the

Jakov Jukić,”Političke religije i memorija zla”, [“Political Religions and the Memory of Evi”], UDC 316:
2,(1996): 1.
25
Stephen Goodwin, “From UN Safehavens to Sacred Spaces: Contributions of Religious Sodalities to Peace
Building and Reconciliation in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Edinburg University Press, Studies in
World Christianity 9, no.2, (2003): 174. https://doi.org/10.3366/swc.2003.9.2.171.
26
Eric Marusen, and Martin Mennecke, “Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Human Rights Review 5, no.4,
(2003): 74.
24
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battlefields, about the dedication of tanks, artillery, and the army, Čhetniks, Ustašas, and even
foreign Russian, Ukrainian, and foreign Muslim Mujahideen fighters.
Furthermore, it is a fact that both older and newer ethnonational parties, particularly
in B&H, were originally organized in churches or mosques. This continued to be the case
with later factions of existing or newly formed national parties, which is understandable,
because ethnicity and national consciousness in the former Yugoslavia were nurtured
exclusively under the leadership of religious institutions. This author suggests that "making
religion" as the sole basis of collective national identity is a typical model of politicized
religion and sacralized politics (where politics is considered a religious obligation), intending
to reorganize social relations on pseudo-religious foundations and functions. The
politicization of religion is evident from the actions of religious leaders in the war and postwar period. There is no doubt that the dominant religious communities in the Balkans
encourage—as seen in their leadership's behavior—the formation of nation-states. Awareness
of the deeper roots of the three religious communities in the three nations is built with the
awareness that national culture and particular national politics cannot survive without it. That
is why they equated nation and religious community and confessional affiliation with
national affiliation. The main agent is that ethnicity and nation are equated with religion.
Religious leaders, who should be the essence of morality, are silent or trivially speaking;
whoever is silent agrees. Simultaneously, the core values of the religious teaching they
preached remain in the background.
If we briefly focus exclusively on B&H, we can observe that the peculiarities of
B&H's historical development influenced the fact that members of its three peoples had a
strong confessional and weak national consciousness. According to the sociologist, Ivan
Cvitković, 27 this has remained a feature to this day. Because religion and even more
denominations offered people "both personal and collective identity" in order to impose the
denomination as a national institution. This is the rule with both the Roman Catholic and
Orthodox Churches and the Islamic Community. In a society such as B&H, the one who
neglects the influence of religion on politics usually makes a mistake, and B&H society,
generally carries the specificity that in it, "ethnic or national identity is most closely linked to
religion," and that the population "does not necessarily distinguish between the religious as a
universal symbol and the one used and abused for political purposes." So when the cross is
mentioned in B&H, it does not mean the Catholic cross, Orthodox (Greek or Russian) cross
27
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but the Croatian national cross or the exclusively Serbian national cross. Also, the crescent in
B&H is always only Bosniak, rather than, say, Arabic. Moreover, in such an environment, the
understanding is imposed that confessional and national affiliation are parts of the same
collective identity. To be a Croat means to be a Catholic and vice versa, to be a Serb means to
be an Orthodox and vice versa, and, finally, to be a Bosniak means to be a Muslim. The result
of this social environment raises the question of the primary value within such a collective
identity. Is it, in other words, first a nation or denomination? Moreover, is a nation a means
expressing a confession or is a confession a means of expressing a nation? This kind of
questioning, following the same logic, also raises the question of the relationship between the
church and politics. Cvitković claims that the boundaries of that relationship were never
clear, not even today. "They are often diffuse, and like any border, sometimes conflicting.
Most often, the politicized religion that raised the Nation to the pedestal of worship
performed the ‘worship’ of the Nation."28
Profiling B&H as a separate entity is not only the result of its survival over the
centuries or a specific cultural milieu created within the state but also its response to the
geopolitical circumstances surrounding it, its geographical entanglement between "two
powerful nationalizing projects, destabilization by imperial geopolitics and devastation by
genocidal violence.”29 Through intensive geopolitical and religious interventions throughout
its history, at the beginning of the 20th century, B&H was under pressure from the
neighboring Serbian or Croatian national idea. According to O'Tuathail, B&H's ability to
reaffirm itself in such an environment as a separate, albeit fragile, geopolitical entity is what
makes it not only special in geopolitical terms, but also different from other parts of exYugoslavia.30 Schematically speaking, the nature of Serbian and Croatian ethnopolitics can
be described as special and decentralized with autonomist forms, and Bosniak as integralist.
The problem with today's integration policy arises because the Bosniak state does not share
an equal political foundation with other people's demands, i.e., the possibility to win others to
the integral concept. One of the constants of history is the aspiration for social, political, and
religious-cultural domination of one group over the other. The fact that Bosnians were a
"unique" people from the 10th to the 20th century, which had three religious denominations,
is completely ignored. At the same time, it is important to suggest that “big-state” concepts
28
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emerge when one political elite tries to "overlap" the ethnic, religious, and political
dimensions. Hence, Serbia's attitudes and efforts should and must be where Serbs are or
Croatia where Croats are. Bosnian misunderstandings are a consequence of these concepts
and the centripetal forces of neighboring great-power aspirations.
At the same time, B& H is home to the Constitution (the Dayton Peace Agreement)
based on "ethnoreligious principles" in the form of religious exclusivism. The Constitution
defines Bosniak-Croat-Serbs as a constituent people. In the B&H's ethnoreligious model,
which is formed by agreement of the three constituent peoples, the demographic remnant is
unconstitutional. For the most part, a mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the
last article of the Preamble of the discriminatory B&H Constitution. Therefore, the term
"Others," in the formulation of "hybrid" identities (mixed ethnic marriages, other ethnicities,
and those who declared themselves as Bosnians) is an unsentimental description of their
position in this ethnoreligiously divided society. Those who do not belong to one of the three
religious groups or do not want to show affiliation are considered a foreign element; they
cannot elect representatives and are barred from running for office at any state level. Several
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)31 have never been implemented.
At the same time, on the example of B&H, we have national pluralism, and in the process of
social differentiation of the domicile population, religion and denomination played a key role,
and the process was supported by the sacralization of the nation and the nationalization of
religious communities. The problem is that religious pluralism in B&H has been introduced
as national/confessional pluralism. Its essence was constituted by three national "war"
political parties (SDA, SDS, HDZ32), each with the strong support of “their” denomination
(Islamic Community, Serbian Orthodox Church, and Croatian Catholic Church). Religious
communities are, even as they may try to dispute this, the most important logistics to
ethnonationalist political philosophies. There are two important moments here: the first is the
awakening of the nation through a return to religious roots. Others are speeches by religious
leaders in election campaigns in which believers are told, most often indirectly, to vote for a
particular party. Religious communities often decide local elections, and at the parliamentary
level, candidates also seek the support of religious groups. Thus, it is impossible to follow the
analysis of the relationship between religion and politics and not look at the role of religion in
elections. Religious communities have been present in politics for almost three decades,
H. Išerič “Judgments of the European Court for Human Rights in Cases Sejdić and Finci, Zornić, Šlaku and
Pilav – nudum ius in BiH,” (2019).
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especially during election campaigns. As much as major religious leaders in principle refrain
from supporting certain parties, lower-ranking priests and imams, either through sermons or
by mere photographs with politicians—and since they are spiritual pastors by vocation and
should be role models to believers—directly or indirectly suggest to believers for whom they
should vote. In B&H, Max Weber's33 assessment that the election campaign is not a struggle
for the future, but a showdown regarding what happened in the (recent) past, has proved
correct. Those who are disappointed with the constant victories of the national parties wish to
return to the liberal theory of one person, one vote. Opponents point out that behind this
principle lies the desire to establish the dominance of the most numerous people. Religious
identity is regarded as the core of the nation in the former Yugoslavia. Post-Yugoslav
interpreters of the "nations" overlook that it is the 21st century and that the world is
organized in nation-states. It seems that this thesis does not fit into the "big state" policies of
the parties in their hegemonic projects conducted under the auspices of "one people, one
state, one religion." Such ethnicism leads directly to conflicts between ethnic groups. When
one of these ethnonational parties claims that a particular territory belongs, or should belong,
only to it, they seek and find like-minded support in their national and confessional (church
and mosque) “guardians.”
If we analyze national parties, the SDA, HDZ, SDS, and other Serbian parties behave
similarly to religious communities, like Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy. It is not just
about religious leaders entering the national territory and helping national parties, but
politicians are also manipulating the faith. To depart from a party means to abandon the faith;
a person becomes a traitor, an apostate. This mechanism has been present in our people for a
very long time, and it prevents them from voting freely in elections.34 Furthermore, all three
political and religious communities strive for their national good. They care more for the
party/national common good than for the common good represented by the common state,
forcing the appropriation and exclusion of religious symbols in favor of only one ethnic
group. In this sense, the abuse of religion corresponds to consent or silence to that abuse. As
stated above, religions are reduced first to the nation, and then to power.
The existence of a "minority and majority" or "friend and enemy" relationship (the
enemy is always that of another religion or atheist) is the foundation of the symbiosis of
political, religious, and ethnonational in ex-Yugoslav communities, which were evident in
33
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wars. Namely, at one of the war negotiations with Karadžić's Serbs, at the Sarajevo airport
Butmir, the negotiator of the Government of the then Republic of B&H asked Momčilo
Krajišnik (then president of the Pale Assembly): 35 "How long will you kill civilians in
Sarajevo?" Krajišnik answered him briefly, "All the time, until you stop wanting to live with
us!"36 The religious background of that fascist answer, according to Bajtal,37 to be precisely
and additionally deciphered from an extremely church-platonical statement of the pre-war
atheist Radovan Karadžić,38 the wartime president of Republika Srpska, who (sometime in
early 1994), when asked about mutual relations and the SDS political party and Serb war
policy in B&H, said: "Our clergy is present in all our thoughts and decisions, and the voice of
the Church is heard as the voice of the highest authority."39 If we move to the present, we can
see that not much has changed. The Serbian member of the Presidency of B&H, Milorad
Dodik, stated that he conveyed the greetings of the people from the Republika Srpska to the
Serbian Patriarch Irinej who knows very well that without the Serbian Orthodox Church,
there is no freedom for the Serbian people. Dodik pointed out that Serbs in Republika Srpska
remained faithful to the Serbian Orthodox Church, to faith and baptism as the essential
elements of Serbian identity.40 Thus, in a broader sense, the presence of religious nationalism
results in insisting on the symbiosis of political and religious, the nationalization of the
denomination that precedes the religion of politics, which is a memory of the pre-political
era, when the religious establishment invoked the right to rule.
Given all the above, it is indisputable that the foundation of the politicization of
religion occurred in the region, especially after the war, highlighting part of the problem. The
process was supported by the sacralization of the nation and the nationalization of religious
communities. The stumbling blocks are the different religious profiles of ethnicity. In fact,
"nationalism requires that one believe too strongly in something that is not so,"41 which is
why the national homeland becomes sacred, too holy, inviolable, unquestionable. Thus, a
more rational notion of "national identity" includes a sense of political community that
Momčilo Krajišnik is a former Bosnian Serb political leader, who, along with Radovan Karadžić, co-founded
the Bosnian Serb nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS). In 2006, Krajišnik was found guilty of committing
crimes against humanity during the Bosnian War (1992–95) by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
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implies "at least some common institutions and a code of rights and duties for all members of
the community, which also refers to a certain social space, a fairly well-defined and limited
area with which members can identify and to whom they consider themselves to belong.42
Besides, religiosity is often exaggerated, politically sentimental, and takes on civilian
forms within a ceremonial character. The most striking example of the politicization of
religion is the education system in B&H. Political projects were started by war, segregation
among ethnic groups continues only through education, within the discriminated educational
phenomenon of "Two schools under one roof.”43 "There are those borders, we don't agree,
and we don't want to be in touch," says a high school student from Mostar, adding that he was
never on the Old Bridge44 out of fear, because, as he says, "someone will recognize that he is
a Croat and get into trouble." "Four students express such an opinion in the same first
sentence. The same student states that he can recognize a "Muslim" crossing the bridge by
"speech, movement, clothing, facial texture, and darker skin." 45 These phenomena show
obvious indoctrination with elements that produce antagonism and violence, creating clones
of ethnoreligious primogenitors and preventing young people's development into moral
citizens-individuals. In this way, ethnopolitics takes care of its reproduction by cultivating
new generations of future xenophobes where young Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats learn to see
objects (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) rather than independent and moral human beings. Thus,
an extremist model emerges of the domination of ethnic discourse over the entire social life.
In political life, ethnocracy replaces democracy, special ethnopolitical totalitarianism replaces
national (state) political orientation, and ethnopolitics, biopolitics, and populism grow
unstoppably against democratic politics. The most important feature of this approach is
certainly the creation of a discourse of "naturalness," supported by different, mostly pseudoscientific, or mythopoetic narratives of a particular nation. The goal of the discourse of
naturalness is to devalue alternative discursive patterns as "utopian" or "abnormal." It is a
kind of naturalistic delusion of the dominant ethnopolitical discourse.
The foundation of the complex relationship between the cunning of politics and the
adjustment of religion can be realized on the example of the war in B&H, where Muslims
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initially did not even think of restoring Islam, much less wanted it as the foundation of their
state and fundamentalist ideology. There were simply no conditions for this because
communism reduced the religiosity of Muslims to a minimum. However, it was precisely the
tragic experiences of the defense for survival that forced them to seek salvation in religion,
for it was—as was mentioned earlier—the effective strategy for their survival, but always
linked to historical memory. The same, of course, applies to other nations. Thus, according to
Jukić,46 the politicization of religion was linked to biological needs, the strategy of genetic
survival, endangered group survival, and the memory of evil. All this is not present in true
religion; at least not to an excessive extent. The fact is that at the moment when the danger of
the disappearance of Bosniaks was threatened, the SDA party put itself at the head of the
people, and everyone who fought to preserve biological survival and religion of Islam joined
the movement. In this context, it can be understood why the Islamic religious community
supported the SDA at the time, but less so later.
Analyzing all religious communities in the former Yugoslavia, starting from the
Bosnian Islamic community (during the period of the former longtime mufti, Dr. Mustafa
Cerić), I suggest that it also fell into the national-constructive discourses of religion in
forming the identity of "Bosniaks," and these tendencies strengthened the notion of
"Bosniak" nationalism. It is important to point out that the Islamic symbols that were
politically mobilized in the war in B&H were not traditional Bosnian Islamic symbols, but
Islamic symbols imported from some Arab countries. That infiltration of symbols influenced
it and continued to do so in the post-war period. Paradoxically, Islam in B&H has never
hidden its aversion to all versions of Wahhabi fundamentalism. Rather, Bosnian Islam openly
supports various initiatives aimed at dialogue, interfaith respect, and coexistence that are
specific to B&H's social conditions. They are similar to Western Europeans of Muslim
descent. A 2013 study by the Pew Research Center shows that they are among the world's
most liberal Muslims. Dr. Cerić openly expressed his political views, which eventually
culminated in his candidacy for the presidency of B&H in 2014. Cerić claimed that Islam is a
strong element of Bosniak nationalism and advocated that B&H become a Bosniak nationstate, since Croats and Serbs already have nation states.47 I maintain that such statements
radicalize and provoke new political and other conflicts. They complicate fragile security
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relations and rhetorically inflate nationalists’ aims, causing Bosniaks' reluctance to more fully
participate in European society.
Political activity is one of the important features of the Serbian Orthodox Church,
which during its history, in addition to religious affairs, was also involved with national
politics, which is a characteristic of all Orthodox churches in the world. During the Ottoman
period, the Serbian Church (i.e., the Patriarchate of Peč) often took over religious and
political leadership. Even later, including in the 20th century, the Church set aside her
primary duty in order to become actively involved in the struggle for the unification of Serbs,
“in which the priest had to be both a teacher and a judge taking up arms, if necessary, to
defend himself and his family.“48 In the early 1990s, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević
sought to re-establish this ethnoreligious identity,49 insisting that Serbian Orthodoxy was at
the core of Serbian national identity and the pride of all Serbs. Milošević, supported the
formula, "All Serbs in one state," which, according to Vojislav Šeselj,50 would include "all
Serbian lands."51 The report of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights estimates that the
Serbian Orthodox Church neglected the universal messages of the Gospel, slipping into
nationalism and that the two main features of its activities are anti-communism and
nationalism, by which it tries to "cleanse" the Serbian national identity of communist
ideology.52 Despite all the criticism, the Serbian Orthodox Church is one of the most trusted
institutions in Serbia.53 Apart from Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church is also influential
politically in some other republics of the former Yugoslavia, such as Montenegro and B&H.
Vesna Pešić estimates that the Serbian Orthodox Church is not a church but a "totem church"
of Serbian origin, understood as a clan community. 54 Today, many criticize the Serbian
Orthodox Church because there is still no public repentance for the war crimes and genocide
in Srebrenica. At the same time, in traditional Serbian culture, the war was understood as a
"way of life" and "philosophy of the universe." The war has an important place in the
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collective memory of Serbs because it is part of the way of life, and not just a myth, legend,
or epic.55
Croatia ranks seventh in Europe in terms of the number of priests per capita, i.e., 56.1
priests per 100,000 inhabitants. As extremely active in the election campaigns, the Catholic
Church gained a special status under ethnopolitical auspices in the 1990s. A Croat historian
Vjekoslav Perica stated that nothing has changed in the relationship between religion and
politics. “The Croatian Church is not democratic: it wants to be the first to control society; it
wants to be above society. It is not seen as part of civil society, on an equal footing with
human rights NGOs and small religious communities advocating humanitarian work. It is the
same as the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), with the SPC openly saying that it is a state
church and a state partner. However, both are primarily nationalist organizations. In Croatia,
Catholicism is ethnic; it is primarily about the Church of the Croats.”56 One example of how
‘healthy’ the Croatian Church is a means of strengthening national identity, accompanied by
an interethnic escalation of tensions, is the period ahead of the ICTY's 57 "Six"58 verdict in
2017. Persistent denial 59 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
convictions of high-ranking participants by Croatian politicians and manipulating the public
is entirely at the joint” criminal” enterprise level.
The politicized religion which is a human form and a non-political religion which is
its mystical goodness that breaks through the resistance of human genetic heritage, finds its
additional justification in some empirical studies of modem psychology and sociology. From
a psychological point of view, A. Vergote, defends the division (following the work of
Gordon Allport) into external and internal religion. The manipulation of historical memory
and, at the same time, the religious justification of that memory proved very successful in
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new social strategies of survival. Anticipating that religious memory is the most resilient,
politics cunningly took advantage of it, reaping all the fruits of that cunning along the way.
With religiously marked myths of innocence, believers are in the realm of socio-political
preparation for the adoption of nationalist-archaic constructions of actors whose “amnesia” is
often a victim of their national-religious narcissism. Politics of parallel memory 60 and
revisionist historical narrative within the politics of fear spread influence among young
people among whom ethnopolitical indoctrination has reception and is left to chance, 61
creating solid preconditions for hostilities in future generations to escalate into violence in
specific political-economic circumstances. Throughout the world, attempts to revise the
results of World War II falsification of historical facts are punishable. However, in the former
Yugoslavia, collaborators of Hitler's genocidal machines, members of political-militaryparamilitary formations (including convicts of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia) regularly receive pensions and medals. Schools and streets are named after them
and they are celebrated at rallies. The commemoration of the events are accompanied by a
ceremonies regularly led by religious officials.62 Paradoxically, World War II strongmen, the
Croat Ante Pavelić,63 and the Serb, Draža Mihailović64 and their Ustaša and Četnik followers
60
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Bulgaria, and northern Albania with Skadar; the cleansing of the state territory of all national minorities and anational elements; the creation of contiguous frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as between
Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandžak and the Muslim and Croat populations
from BiH.” Directive of 20 December 1941, according to Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia,
1941-1945 The Chetniks, (Stanford: University of California, 1975), 170.
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are being praised by nationalists and clerics of the region as patriots, while true anti-fascists
and communists have acquired the stigma of national traitors. According to some media
Ustaša, Četniks and the like are becoming more and more noble.
By

instrumentalizing

the

issue

of

ethnic/national/confessional

radicalization of political discourse, ethnic homogenization occurs.

within

the

The result is that

ethnopolitical parties remain in power. Ethnic mobilization encourages and spreads a sense of
homogeneity and equality and creates a sense of security and power in the collective "We."
Therefore, the whole process of ethnic mobilization ends with the imposition of a kind of prepolitical equalization of the people and their political elite, which is now expected to lead
them through the difficulties of the hostile transitional environment within the highly
homogenized ex-Yugoslav political space.

Conclusion
The relationship between religion and politics is one of the most complex, profoundly
far-reaching, and decisive relationships in shaping societies, particularly in areas that have
undergone a sudden transition of order and values due to war conflicts, destruction, crime,
persecution, and transitional anomalies, such as those of the former Yugoslavia. The use of
ethnic/national/confessional affiliation in discourse today in the former Yugoslavia
(especially during election campaigns) produces further political radicalization. Wherever
religious principles are introduced into the "political field" and governmental policies are
introduced into the "religious space," religious interest becomes secondary, and political
attention is predominant. As a form of political power, politicized religions are,
psychologically speaking, unconscious non-faith, whether they are accepted or rejected by
believers, which the "actor" necessarily instrumentalizes. In contrast, in a non-politicized
religion, only faith is the goal of the believer's preoccupation. As an ethnically-ideologized
religion, it ceases to be an authentic religion. Faith should be the essential ingredient of
religion, more critical than its rituals and daily political reckonings.
The constant relationship between religions and wars means that humanity has
always lived in a paradoxical circumstance because religion is inherently incompatible with
aggressive war—which must be distinguished from defensive ones. During the dramatic
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, religious communities and their clergy promoted
sacral-national authority to ravage and kill. However, God can never be conceived as a
murderer of other, different people/nations: "God" is not the instigator of devastation and
crime.
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Due to new national-state theoretical inadequacy, i.e., nationalism as an ideology,
religion is used as an instrument of socialization and legitimization of new national-political,
i.e., state subjects. Ethnopolitics and religious exclusivism as hegemonic projects conducted
under the auspices of "one people, one state, one religion," (ethnophiletism), and the
appropriation and exclusion of symbols of the religion for only one ethnic origin lead directly
to conflicts between ethnic groups. In this way, religion, as such, which has its universal
metaphysical contents, becomes instead instrumentalized for obscure daily political purposes.
Religious contents become instruments or means of differentiation among nations.
When nation and religion are identified as "controversial" and “others” are marked
as potentially dangerous by a policy that allegedly aims to "affirm" and "protect" its people
and their faith, then in local historical-current circumstances, it necessarily implies
antagonisms in the most dramatic conflicts. Reducing the nation to a single religious group is
an authoritarian tendency; it attempts to completely take revert to a historical moment of
dangerous backwardness, contrary to the times in which we live. Instead of relying on divine
power as in the past, the modern state is initially political, based on the rule of law. Without
imaginatively developed democracies with all their legal and political potential, the ethnicreligious construction of nations creates destabilization of society and deepening conflicts
among ethnic groups.
Clerical-nationalist ideologies in the region have not departed the political stage.
They more or less openly continue their ideological policies. In a symbolic sense, this region
is burdened with a kind of negative ontology that is very difficult to change.65 Given the gap
between the authentic religious part and a hypocritical part of religion, which I call political
religion, it is questionable whether it is capable to change its attitude of historical revisionism
and the politics of memory. A memory of "evil" that metamorphosed and was stored
subsequently becomes the dominant form of behavior that marks new generations. Living in
multi-confessional and politically fragile regions requires a careful but above all, truthful
interpretation of historical events, particularly in frozen conflict entities.
Instead of being places of exclusion and nurturing a cult of premodernity, religious
communities of B&H and the rest of ex-Yugoslavia should build trust, inclusion, and a
transformative environment. It is essential to state that religious abuse for political purposes
is not the fault of religion, but of religious leaders. Religious communities should focus more
Faruk Hadžić, “The political psychology of extremism; “naturalness” of the phenomenon in the Western
Balkans”, Technium Social Sciences Journal, 11(1), 250-267. (2020) : 264,
https://doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v11i1.1519.

65

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (SEPTEMBER 2020) XL, 7

127

on society than on the nation/state by affirmative and constructive action and enrich people's
lives with lasting values that will contribute to society and, thereby, the state. They should
contribute to social and psychological health, in order to produce a culture of reconciliation.
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